

Chaplain Corps' Strategy XXI

In response to the changing needs and requirements of the Naval Services, the Chaplain Corps has developed Strategy XXI, a process to examine its role, missions, functions, and structure. The Navy Chief of Chaplains asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to support Strategy XXI. We examined a broad range of issues, including the Chaplain Corps' organizational structure, concepts for providing religious ministry, and promotions and promotion perceptions within the Chaplain Corps.

As the Director of Religious Ministry for the Department of the Navy, the Navy Chief of Chaplains is responsible for managing and directing the Chaplain Corps. The Chaplain Corps' billet structure, however, is managed by 12 manpower claimants and funded by 12 resource sponsors. This structure limits the Chief of Chaplains' ability to carry out his mission and restricts flexibility to move billets across manpower claimants in response to religious ministry requirements to better support the Services. We recommended that the Chaplain Corps explore an alternative: replace the 12 manpower claimants with a single claimant, the Chief of Chaplains. Under such a structure, the Chief of Chaplains would have not only the responsibility for managing the Chaplain Corps but also the authority to do so. He would be able to identify and respond to changing religious ministry requirements and move chaplain and enlisted Religious Program Specialists (RP) billets to address those requirements more effectively and efficiently.

The Navy Chief of Chaplains is also responsible for implementing religious ministry in the Naval Services. The Chaplain Corps' current organizational concept for providing religious ministry is

known as *coverage*, a resource-driven administrative concept of managing chaplains and their RPs through assignment. We recommended that the Chaplain Corps consider *access*, an alternative approach based on requirements. With access, requirements for all elements of religious ministry at each command are identified, and the available and appropriate resources are provided to satisfy them. Access moves the focus away from managing the provider of religious ministry—the chaplain and RP—to satisfying the needs of the recipients of ministry—the Sailors, Marines, and Coastguardsmen.

Interviews of chaplains and line officers conducted during the study revealed widespread perceptions of bias in the promotion process. We investigated these claims by analyzing personnel and manpower data on promotions to O-4, O-5, and O-6 by race/ethnicity, gender, faith group, and community served. We found no meaningful differences in promotion rates by race/ethnicity or gender at any of the levels we analyzed. We found only one difference by faith group: the Roman Catholic promotion rate was significantly higher at the promotion-to-O-5 level. However, when we examined promotions of a smaller sample—those taking place after 1986—we found no meaningful difference. This change may be related to a change in composition of promotion boards at that time.

We found several differences in promotion rates by assignment. Chaplains serving the most time in many of the assignment types had a lower probability of promotion. This result is not unexpected; chaplains with considerable time in one assignment type would not have had the kind of diverse career that may be favored by promotion boards. Other results were less expected. Chaplains with time in Washington-area billets consis-

tently had a higher probability of promotion. A single tour in the Marine Corps was associated with higher promotion rates to O-5 and O-6. Chaplains without time in medical billets had higher promotion rates to O-5 and O-6; those with more than 30 months in medical billets had lower promotion rates to these ranks. Chaplains with more than 27 months in Coast Guard assignments had a lower rate of promotion to O-6.

In response to perceptions of promotional bias, we provided the Chaplain Corps with several recommendations. First, the Chaplain Corps should make the results of this analysis known. Faulty perceptions thrive on rumor and the absence of information. The Chaplain Corps also should consider reforming the promotion process. This reform could include changes to the promotion boards to include more non-chaplain officers and removing all overt faith group information from each candidate's Performance Summary Record. Finally, the Chaplain Corps should work to eliminate differences in fitness reporting. This might include providing broad guidance to commanders on what constitutes good religious ministry in order to minimize differences in fitness reporting across the Naval Services, reconsidering the practice of chaplains writing fitness reports for other chaplains, and orienting all chaplains to the Navy and the evaluation process so that all new chaplains start with a common knowledge base.

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Navy engagement in the Black Sea region

CNA recently completed a study of the Black Sea region for NAVEUR. We examined issues ranging from potential conflicts, energy developments, and the implications of NATO involvement to the 1936 Montreux Convention that limits the Black Sea presence of external navies (including the U.S. Navy). We paid particular attention to how peacetime naval engagement activities can be tailored to achieve stability and other U.S. goals in the region. Although the Black Sea is not the most unstable part of the European theater, its lit-

toral includes new countries; countries with failing economies and serious ethnic tensions; and Russia, whose proximity is relevant to most of the issues we explored. The theater also includes Turkey, a strong U.S. ally that appears to be resolving many of the issues that have held it back in the past and that is pursuing its own interests in the Black Sea region.

We identified several issues with potential implications for the Navy:

- Black Sea navies, apart from Turkey's, are weak and underfunded. Bulgaria and Romania have decided to downsize their navies and build up ground and air forces in preparation for joining NATO. This provides opportunities for the Coast Guard to participate in Black Sea engagement programs.
- Potential crises for which the Navy could be called on to respond in the Black Sea are likely to involve a range of emergency and humanitarian operations.
- Parties to the Montreux Convention are not likely to modify or terminate it. The provisions of the convention will continue to constrain the U.S. Navy: aircraft carriers, submarines, and larger classes of combat vessels are barred from the Black Sea; ships displacing 10,000 tons or less may enter in limited numbers for up to 21 days. But in a crisis, the Navy (with Turkey's cooperation) might make use of provisions that allow for its suspension in a few narrowly defined contingencies.

We concluded that naval engagement in Black Sea countries can contribute to U.S. objectives, and that there is a case for some increase in such traditional peacetime Navy activities as ship visits, exercises, and senior-level visits and exchanges. New forms of naval engagement designed to deal with sources of instability before they require military intervention must be tailored carefully, and target audiences and intermediate goals must be identified in advance.

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Helicopter force requirements

The Navy has embarked on a major modernization of its helicopter force by 2010. The plan includes converting SH-60B and F helicopters to the SH-60R equipped with a low-frequency dipping sonar, ISAR radar, Hellfire, and a new countermeasure system. The Navy is also buying CH-60S helicopters to replace its aging logistics helos and to assume the combat search and rescue (SAR) mission of the HH-60 and airborne mine countermeasures mission (AMCM) of the MH-53.

CNA has been assessing helicopter force requirements under OPNAV N88 sponsorship. This work has been coordinated with a COMSEC-ONDFLEET review of helicopter force organization. We began by determining the number of helicopters needed to support forward-deployed units for normal operations, crises, and the initial stages of a conflict. With retirement of the S-3, meeting potential surface and sub-surface threats will require a P-3 on-station, an E-2 to help track surface contacts, and 14 SH-60Rs to identify and prosecute contacts. This equates to six SH-60Rs on the carrier and two on each surface combatant (i.e., *filling the rails*).

Sustaining this posture requires 254 SH-60Rs: 60 deployed; 110 for workups, squadron training, non-deployed ops, and the reserves; and 84 for the fleet replacement squadron, pipeline, R&D, and a few miscellaneous tasks. The resulting force could fill the rails of all forward-based and forward-deployed ships plus those CONUS-based forces that arrive during the first 30 days of a major war. Later arriving forces would have only one SH-60R per surface combatant, but this should be acceptable by this time in the war because the threat will be reduced.

An additional 42 airframes are needed to replace peacetime attrition over the next 20 years. This brings the requirement to 296 SH-60Rs—in contrast to the 240 to 250 SH-60B and F airframes available for conversion. To close this gap, the Navy will need to realize efficiencies in the shore structure and perhaps accept 12 rather than 14 SH-60Rs per battle group (4 per carrier rather

than 6). This will increase the risks and also underscore the importance of using the battle group helicopters on both the carrier and the surface combatants as a single force.

In addition to the SH-60Rs, the Navy will need 180-230 CH-60s to provide the traditional logistics, SAR, and combat SAR support throughout the fleet; assume the new mission for organic airborne MCM; and augment the SH-60R for surface warfare missions. The precise number of CH-60s will depend on whether LANTFLT's experiment with commercial helos for Military Sealift Command ships leads to wider outsourcing of logistics tasks, and whether the Navy maintains a dedicated CONUS-based AMCM squadron with CH-60s.

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Marine Corps BOQs

In a recently completed analysis of bachelor officer housing conducted for the Marine Corps, we examined the preferences of officers for on-base and off-base housing and evaluated the relative costs of both. Today, about 12 percent of Marine bachelor officers live on base in bachelor officer quarters. Another 10 percent would opt to live on base if space were available. The remaining 78 percent of Marine bachelor officers prefer living off-base. The BOQs currently house about one-quarter of the most junior bachelor officers and fewer than 10 percent of more senior officers.

Should the Marine Corps invest in new BOQs? We found that the cost to provide new BOQs is higher than the cost of housing allowances (both measured in FY99 dollars). Annual costs to maintain BOQs are difficult to measure accurately. The estimates range from \$3,300 to \$6,500 for an occupied BOQ space. Those estimates, however, do not capture the cost of construction. Indeed, the annualized cost to construct and maintain new BOQ spaces can be as high as \$13,700. In contrast, the annual housing allowance costs for USMC bachelor officers are slightly less than \$8,000.

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Coast Guard force planning

The Director of Operations Capability, Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, asked CNA to assess the Coast Guard's force planning process and recommend improvements to it. CNA recommended the development of a framework that the Coast Guard could implement to improve its force planning processes. After reviewing the relevant law and doctrine and examining the Coast Guard's many missions, we developed a supply vs. demand framework. The framework balances the demand for Coast Guard services (e.g., maritime security and protection of natural resources) with the Coast Guard assets available to meet the demand (e.g., cutters, aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure). The framework also distinguishes between resource allocation and force planning. Resource allocation focuses on near-term organizational management goals—in other words, using available forces in the best manner to accomplish the operational tasks. Force planning focuses on longer term national goals—in other words, determining the number of forces needed to meet the national goals.

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A common tactical surface picture

Maintaining a common tactical surface picture is a persistent challenge facing the battle group. In particular, traditional communication paths are not sufficient to share information gained at one unit with the rest of the battle group. The CNA field representative to COMCRUDESGRU Eight aboard USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* recognized the introduction of IT-21 technologies as a means to address some of the communications problems

facing the Force Over-the-Horizon Track Coordinator (FOTC).

The battle group has found that using the Net Precedence communications channel of the Global Command and Control System–Maritime (GCCS-M) to transmit position reports among IT-21-capable ships and shore facilities is a more reliable and timely method than UHF or EHF satellite communications. On-line chat sessions have proved useful for coordination, real-time status and position updates, and collective problem resolution. Web browsing allows the FOTC watchstanders to tap into battle group and national resources, such as the Office of Naval Intelligence's SeaLink database and FOTC connectivity charts. E-mail is used to distribute messages, graphic intensive checklists and standard operating procedures, and machine-readable messages directly into GCCS-M for processing.

Comparison of the *SIPRNET FOTC* operation with previous practices reveals its advantages:

- Messages are transmitted 90 percent faster.
- Transmission reliability has increased 50 percent.
- The number of ships with track commonality has increased more than 50 percent.
- The number of ship contacts regularly tracked within the area of interest has increased 300 to 500 percent.

And these improvements consume less than one percent of the available bandwidth for carriers and cruisers.

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